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The current global financial crisis has revealed that many 
economies, both developed and developing, have become 
increasingly ‘financialised’. This Development Viewpoint focuses on the 
‘financialisation’ of the international marketing of coffee (the agro-
commodity most traded on international exchanges) and the impact on 
local producers and traders in developing countries. 
The term financialisation has been variously defined. In its broadest 
sense, it can be described as “the increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies” (Epstein 2005, 
p. 3). 
International coffee markets have become financialised in at least two 
major respects. Firstly, there has been increased portfolio investment 
in commodities such as coffee as an asset class. The Figure shows that 
Futures Contracts on coffee rose to account for about two-thirds of all 
coffee trading in 2007.
Initially, futures markets were developed predominantly to allow 
the effective management of the risks faced by traders of physical 
commodities such as coffee. However, they have evolved to increasingly 
reflect the needs of financial investors operating entirely outside of the 
markets for physical commodities. 
Financial investors have increased their share of trading in commodity 
derivatives throughout the period since the end of the Bretton Woods 
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system in 1973. Also, new large institutional investors, such as hedge 
funds, have become much more active in such trading. Most traders in 
futures have no interest, in fact, in dealing with coffee as a physical item: 
they are constantly trading ‘paper coffee’ in order to derive profits from 
price changes. 
As a result of these factors, the value of outstanding Over-the-Counter 
commodity derivatives in June 2007 had risen to over US$ 7.5 trillion, 
compared with US$ 0.77 trillion in 2002 and US$ 0.44 trillion in 1998 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2007).
 
The second reason that international coffee markets have become 
financialised is that the firms that deal in physical commodities have 
increasingly come to resemble financial holding companies, dealing 
in a wide spectrum of financial services and financial investments. The 
proportion of the revenues of these firms deriving from such financial 
activities has been growing relative to the revenues derived directly 
from the trading of physical commodities. 
Moreover, commodity trading companies have increasingly placed 
‘risk management’ at the centre of their core competencies. They can 
now refer their clients to their in-house research departments and 
futures brokerages, which are able to cater to both traders of physical 
commodities and investors seeking to diversify their financial portfolios. 
Futures Trading and Coffee Prices
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that where markets are 
efficient—and futures exchanges are thought to be some of the most 
efficient—changes in prices should reflect changes in supply and 
demand conditions. However, recent increases in futures trading on 
the New York coffee exchange by commodity index funds (such as the 
Standard & Poor’s GSCI and the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index) 
has distorted the relationship between prices and market conditions 
(Newman 2009). 
Consequently, between 2002 and 2007 coffee prices increased at a 
rate higher than that warranted by changes in supply and demand and 
became significantly more volatile. The price of the so-called New York 
coffee ‘C’ futures contract is now the single most important factor in the 
determination of the price of coffee. 
Such trading of futures has become more influential since the collapse in 
1989 of the regime of managed prices based on the International Coffee 
Agreement (ICA). The liberalisation of the coffee marketing systems in 
many producing countries, which has been hastened by conditionalities 
imposed by World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs, has also 
contributed to financialisation. 
With the demise of price stabilisation programs at the international or 
national level, the World Bank and other donor organisations have
Source: Commodities Futures Trading Commission  2009
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been recently pushing for the widespread use of futures contracts 
as instruments to manage the risk of price changes. For instance, the 
World Bank has been actively promoting the use of futures contracts 
by local coffee producers and traders as a ‘market-friendly’ tool of risk 
management. These donor efforts have helped intensify the impact of 
futures prices on the current market prices of coffee.
Changing Power Relations
Because of the collapse of the ICA and the liberalisation of coffee 
marketing systems, local producers and traders in coffee-exporting 
countries are bearing the full brunt of  low and increasingly unstable 
coffee prices. This has been the case whether they are organised into 
cooperative marketing systems, such as in Tanzania, or work through 
private marketing channels, such as in Uganda (Newman forthcoming).
The Ugandan producers who market their coffee through private 
marketing chains are confronted with low prices while the local traders 
have to shoulder the risks associated with price volatility. In Tanzania, 
marketing cooperatives are able to spread the risks of price instability 
across their membership, but such localised arrangements can only 
marginally mitigate the overall risks. In both cases, international coffee 
exporters have maintained the positions of power in determining prices 
since they can hedge their risks through futures trading.
One might assume that national-level collective marketing strategies 
could improve the share of the world coffee price received by local 
producers. However, such an approach cannot address the major driver 
of inequalities in incomes along the whole coffee value chain. This is the 
uncontested power of international coffee trading companies to derive 
increasingly larger shares of their revenue from futures and options 
trading. 
Trading in futures contracts involves high costs, not only for purchasing 
the contracts themselves but also for financing margin calls. Such 
financing becomes necessary when oscillations in the current price fall 
outside the ‘margin’ that is set below the original purchase price by the 
futures contract.
 
Because of such expenses, only the largest trading companies have 
been able to profit from trading futures. They have the financial 
capacity to fund margin calls and weather any large losses associated 
with sudden adverse changes in price. Hence, they have accumulated 
considerable market power. Developing-country export companies find 
themselves effectively excluded from such profit-making since the risk-
management tools available to them are very limited.
Responses to the Current Crisis
There is an urgent need to rein in and regulate the financialisation of 
coffee markets. The current effort to extend hedging instruments to 
developing-country producers and traders is certainly not the answer.
One approach could involve separating the process of price 
determination of the physical commodity from that generated by a 
futures contract. Such separation has been achieved on a very limited 
basis for fair-trade and gourmet coffees, which represent small niche 
markets. Another option would be to revive, in some form, the kind of 
collective price agreement that was created by the International Coffee 
Agreement. 
However, even if such reforms were successful in helping reduce the 
impact of speculation on current coffee prices, they would likely achieve 
little in overcoming the enormous inequalities in power and income 
that have arisen between large international trading companies and 
local producers and traders in developing countries. More fundamental 
reforms would be needed to resolve this problem.
* This research was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation through the 
NCCR Trade Regulation Project. 
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